MPs should be free to vote in line with their best judgment and not be required to obey any party whips.

In the good old days (as far as they ever existed) Parliament was based on individuals in the legislature being representatives of their constituencies who could challenge and determine the correctness of the proposals of the monarch and ministers. MPs had the freedom to vote as they saw best in all the circumstances. In his 1774 Letter to the Electors of Bristol, Edmund Burke stated about MPs:

“His unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you or to any set of men living.”

Nowadays of course Members of Parliament almost entirely do sacrifice their judgment to “any set of men living”, they being the party to which they belong. It is very rare for any Government to suffer any defeat in the House of Commons and indeed the current Labour Government suffered no such policy defeat throughout its first two terms from 1997-2005 when it enacted much contentious legislation. MPs were characterised as early as 1946 by the Conservative MP Christopher Hollis:

“On most votes it would be simpler and more economic to keep a flock of tame sheep and from time to time to drive them through the division lobbies in the appropriate numbers”.

MPs are corralled, with the graphic word “whipped” being used to describe the process, to vote in line with the wishes of their party leadership. They often vote for a motion with only the very slightest idea of what it entails. This is evidenced from those MPs who are not attending a debate, usually over 80% of the total, but are at another meeting within the Division Bell area who have to rush to vote. They will often admit that they have little idea about the substance of the motion on which they are voting. Almost all of what is approved by Parliament is now just a rubber stamp of what has been decided by a Government department.

One of the key advantages of the concept of independent MPs is that it would ensure better scrutiny of legislation and regulation.

In Westminster the reputation and effectiveness of the “Mother of Parliaments” have become perverted by the reinforcing effect of strong political parties and the power of Prime Ministers. Parliament no longer satisfies the electorate nor oversees a system of Government which allows the UK to be competitive in the 21st century.

Political parties have grown and now prevail in our political system. Consequently the voting choices of MPs are dominated by their being just delegates of their political party, often described as “lobby fodder”. Parliament is in disrepute because its traditional scrutiny role has been taken away and it only rarely provides any serious challenge to the authority of the executive. The growth in:

• the strength of the central political party organisations and whipping system
• the number of Westminster Village MPs whose career depends on party patronage, and
• the power of the party leaders to dominate policy development
• have all led to individual MPs having almost no opportunity to make their views count through their primary functions of scrutiny and voting.

Even the ‘Free Votes’, allowed on issues of conscience such as abortion and euthanasia, are becoming more and more restricted. In our view there is clearly no democratic justification for matters of equal or greater significance to the British population being whipped when some directly of interest to only a minority of people can be given a free vote.

Legislation about going to war, establishing major new Government agencies, increasing Government intervention in the economy or in an individual’s private life, deciding on how personal or corporate income should be redistributed through the taxation system and a vast number of other legislative and regulatory proposals are also ones which directly impact on the lives of UK citizens as much as or indeed more than those on which a free vote is allowed.

In contrast to the current whipped, and therefore minimal, legislative process, all of these matters would benefit from a free and fair discussion in the House of Commons. There is a strong argument for less but better legislation. Unfortunately the whipping system does not allow any substantive or effective debate.

It is sometimes said that party or collective responsibility is necessary for decisions to be made. However, as with the City of London, places like the Isle of Man operate very effectively with a majority of Independent MPs and no preponderant political parties. Similarly some councils such as Shetland and Orkney are entirely composed of Independent councillors and many councils now operate with no overall control.

In other countries, such as the US, the whipping system is much weaker, as the whips cannot bargain with a congressman by denying promotion or through other sanctions. The legislatures nevertheless operate effectively.

The only real challenge to the UK Government is now through the crossbenchers in the House of Lords who are individuals acting on the basis that they have a free vote which is not whipped by any party. The success of the Lords’ crossbenchers in enforcing better discussion of Government proposals in recent years provides very strong support in favour of allowing similar discussions and votes, unfettered by party whipping, to take place in the House of Commons. It should also be noted that the crossbenchers act as a formal group, even electing their own chair, but these structures confine themselves to administrative matters and do not direct any political policy, exactly as envisaged for the Jury Team.

The absence of the party whip does not bring chaos and in contrast leads to perfectly acceptable Parliamentary decisions which indeed usually have more credibility because it is known that MPs have exercised their own judgment rather than just being lobby fodder.

MPs, ministers and their political staff should be paid according to civil service pay scales, should have any expenses approved only in line with established civil service guidelines and must act according to the Nolan Committee on Standards of Public Life. Principles that apply to all public bodies.

People believe in democracy and expect their elected representatives to demonstrate its ideals. Unfortunately politicians are not now generally seen as sufficiently experienced or competent for the offices which they hold, as operating in a trustworthy manner or as being in the job for the benefit of their constituents rather than for themselves. Most of those now seeking to become MPs, and most of the front benches of the three main political parties, are people who have only been in the ‘Westminster Village’ since leaving college, working as research analysts, marketing advisers, journalists or in other similar capacities.Even those MPs who have previously worked outside the immediate Westminster Village have tended to choose areas such as public relations rather than actually leading or managing in a charitable, commercial or public organisation. As a result such people tend to see the world mainly through the lens of short term media acceptance rather than longer term strategies and implementation.People who would find it difficult to get a responsible job running the whole or part of any other significant organisation are suddenly given legitimacy by being selected by a political party and becoming MPs. A fair proportion of these, typically at least 40%, will subsequently become ministers. It is clear that there would be no likelihood of most of these people gaining an equivalent position in any other walk of life and it is therefore the endorsement of the political party label which gives them the opportunity for their apparent success in gaining a ministerial appointment.Although there are many MPs who do not misuse their position, in the last forty years there have been a number of government scandals which have eroded people’s trust in MPs. As a result of the political scandals during his Government, John Major set up the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life.

Unfortunately the establishment of the Nolan Committee has not substantially increased public confidence. Surveys in 2004 showed only 16% of voters felt that standards in public life had improved, that only 17% of the public thought that MPs showed a “high moral code” and that only 27% trusted them generally.

A mood of discontent about the political system not only permeates the population in total but also exists amongst backbench MPs themselves. They wonder if their role is really a worthwhile one in the light of what they can actually achieve with the very little real power that they have while being constantly criticised over their behaviour and expenses.

An MP currently has an annual salary of £63,291. In addition London MPs also receive a London Weighting Allowance of £7,500 which was increased by 157% from the previous figure of £2,916 in a Commons vote on the 3rd July 2008.

Ministers receive a separate salary in addition to the salary of £63,291 received by them as MPs. The additional rate for the four key levels of minister is:

However ministers have to be fully committed to their official duties and therefore have less time for their constituencies. They are also of course prohibited from actively scrutinising or criticising Government policy in Parliament. This used to be recognised by the Top Salaries Review Body with ministers only receiving two thirds of the MPs salary in addition to their ministerial salary. This practice has however been discontinued and ministers now receive both full salaries.

The issue of expenses is a particularly sensitive one for many voters. It has become clear that MPs have become used to using taxpayers money, even within the rules, in a way which would never be sanctioned in any other charitable, commercial or public organisation. This includes housing expenses when other housing is available, relatively excessive personal purchases (the John Lewis list) and the employment of relatives without any proper independent selection procedure or appraisal.

In addition to their £63,291 salary, Members can claim the following annual allowances:

The House of Commons Library provides the following further information about MPs’ traveling, termination and pension expenses:

• Members are currently provided with corporate travel cards that may be used to purchase travel tickets, for journeys by rail, sea or air on Parliamentary business. These cover journeys within the triangle of home, constituency and Westminster. Members may also use parking spaces, for which no charge is made, in the Parliamentary car park. Journeys may also be made by the spouse, and children under the age of 18, of a Member between London and the constituency and/or London and home by rail, air or sea. In addition MPs have a car mileage allowance of 40p per mile for the first 10,000 miles and 25p thereafter, a motorcycle allowance of 24p per mile and a bicycle allowance of 20p per mile, all available in the same triangle as the other travel allowances. Costs of journeys outside this triangle, on Parliamentary business, may also be reimbursed if the Member notifies the Operations Directorate at least three days in advance – the three day rule may be waived in exceptional circumstances.
• Members are also reimbursed for the cost of traveling on Parliamentary duties between the United Kingdom and any European Union institution in Brussels, Luxembourg or Strasbourg or the national Parliament of a member of the Council of Europe or the European Union or of any candidate member of the EU. The scheme allows the aggregate of the cost of a return business class airfare from a London airport to one of the designated destinations and twice the corresponding civil service class A standard subsistence rate in operation.
• A “Resettlement Grant” is paid to assist with the costs of adjusting to “non-Parliamentary life” to any person who ceases to be an MP at a General Election, based on age and length of service, and varies between 50% and 100% of the annual salary payable to an MP at the time of the Dissolution.
• A “Winding-Up Allowance and Resettlement Grant” of up to one third of the annual Staffing Allowance and Incidental Expenses Allowance is paid for the reimbursement of the cost of any work on Parliamentary business undertaken on behalf of a defeated or retiring Member after the date of cessation of Membership.
• MPs get a pension accruing at 1/40th for every year of service (so after 20 years, for instance, they get half their salary as an inflation-proofed pension) for which they pay 10% of salary and the Government pays 26.8%. This compares with a 1/60th civil service scheme.

In July 2008, the House of Commons voted against proposals to limit and regularise their expense claims.

It is essential that MPs are seen as operating under the same constraints as apply to their electorate in terms of their salaries and expenses, especially as public money is involved. The civil service has a clear policy on salaries and expenses.

The Jury Team Governance Proposals therefore include that all MPs should be subject to the same regime as senior civil servants.

An independent commission would be established to decide which grade of civil servant is currently equivalent to an MP and salaries and expenses would then be increased for MPs in line with the average for all employees in the country (not in line with civil service pay as MPs have direct control of this).

An independent Politicians Complaints Commission, modeled on the Independent Police Complaints Commission, with its Board appointed by a panel of designated NGOs, should be established to investigate accusations about national and local politicians, basing its judgments on the Nolan Committee principles that apply to all public bodies.

As a result of public concern with certain activities of the police force, the Independent Police Complaints Commission was set up. This investigates specific defined events, such as when a member of the public is killed by a policeman on duty, and can also respond to complaints from the general public. It is properly independent and has helped to investigate and determine the validity of various actions by the police.

Unfortunately the politicians have not seen fit to set up an equivalent body to investigate their own behaviour.

Any sanctions against MPs or Lords for their activities are decided by other MPs or Lords who may well have, or at least be seen to have, a vested interest in maintaining generous arrangements and flexibility for their colleagues.

Similarly the appointment and resignation of ministers is solely in the hands of the Prime Minister who is inevitably biased towards protecting the reputation of the minister concerned in order to try to prevent this from rebounding on the reputation of his or her party.

In other areas of public service, and indeed in the private sector, any employee found guilty of corruption or fiddling expenses is likely to be heavily disciplined and probably reported to the police. It is quite clear that the criminal law applies to all such incidents outside Parliament and there is no reason why it should not also do so for MPs and Lords. It is vital if respect for Parliament is to be increased that the public has faith that MPs and Lords are subject to the same sanctions as themselves if they go against the agreed rules and either misspend public money or act in an improper way.

Ministers are subject to The Ministerial Code of Conduct which is set out in a booklet that is required reading of all ministers. However any ministers who violate the Code are only subject to whatever investigation the Prime Minister feels is suitable. Typically the Prime Minister, who is the sole judge and jury of any breaches, will try to defend his or her ministers for as long as possible, often leading to further damaging revelations becoming public.

Prime Ministers defend their ministerial colleagues because it otherwise could be bad for their party. One of the additional advantages of the Jury Team proposals is that it would be easier for the Prime Minister to fire a minister as there would be no party to defend. In the fullness of time the appointment and firing of ministers could become a matter for the relevant Select Committee.

It is clearly unacceptable for MPs, Lords or Ministers not to be subject to proper independent investigation and, if necessary, sanction if they have violated the agreed rules. It has become quite clear that self policing either by the Privileges Committee or by the Prime Minister is not only ineffective but undermines public confidence. The Jury Team therefore proposes the setting up of an independent Politicians Complaints Commission modeled on the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

The Principles that should apply

The seven ‘Nolan Committee’ Principles of Public Life are now well established in all parts of the public sector. They should clearly also apply to MPs, Lords and ministers and should be the basis of the principles used by the independent Politicians Complaints Commission to decide on issues which come before it.

• Selflessness
  Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.
• Integrity
  Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties.
• Objectivity
  In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for awards or benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit.
• Accountability
  Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.
• Openness
  Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.
• Honesty
  Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest.
• Leadership
  Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example.

The appointment of members of independent commissions is itself fraught with political difficulty under current arrangements. In order to reduce any political interference it was finally agreed by the Government that the members of the Judicial Appointments Commission would be agreed through panels themselves chosen by bodies other than the Government.

This same principle needs to be applied to the membership of the independent Politicians Complaints Commission.

The Hayden Phillips Report recommendations on capping donations to political parties should be accepted and enforced.

The problems of funding political parties are a symptom of the problems which parties have in modern society. The great majority of people do not want to give money to a political party. They may support it at an election but they are not even prepared to give it annually the cash equivalent of the cost of a DVD (for instance the Conservative Party annual subscription is normally £15). If political parties cannot get money from a wide proportion of the population then they are forced to go to specific funders.

Party political funding is a major concern of voters. There is a huge suspicion that those donating large sums are able to influence party policies. This thesis has credibility given the concentration of power in the party oligarchies with few checks or balances. The lack of any independence among MPs and any proper independent scrutiny by either Select Committees or Departments leads to the suspicion that party leaders can have their view of an issue changed by a donor and that it will then become law.

The Electoral Commission’s quarterly spending report for July to September 2008 shows that the Labour Party received major (more than £5,000) donations of £7.5 million from only 77 organisations and people and the Conservatives £4 million from only 260 organisations and people. This total number of major donors of 337 is less than one in 100,000 of the electorate of 45 million people. The Liberal Democrats raised £0.6 million. Labour’s debts now stand at £15,762,280, compared with £12,113,165 owed by the Tories.

Party funding reform has been considered many times from the Houghton Committee in 1976 to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 1994, the Neill Committee in 1998, the Electoral Commission report in 2005 and the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee investigations in 2006.

As a result of the furore surrounding the “Cash for Peerages” scandal, in March 2006 Tony Blair, announced that there would be a review of the funding of political parties to be conducted by Sir Hayden Phillips, a retired civil servant. Sir Hayden produced an initial report in March 2007 “Strengthening Democracy: Fair and Sustainable Funding of Political Parties”, and this was then discussed between the three major parties.

Resulting from public consultation on that report, in August 2007 a draft agreement was put to the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties by the Hayden Phillips Secretariat The purpose of that document was stated to be: “This new approach aims to restore public trust in the probity of party finances by setting a limit on the amount which any individual or organisation can donate to a political party.”

It is clear that political funding is a major issue both for political parties and for the electorate. The Jury Team therefore proposes that the recommendations of the Hayden Phillips Report in relation to political donations should be accepted and made law in order to help to clean up this aspect of British politics.

Key Recommendations of the Hayden Phillips Report

The key provision of the Hayden Phillips Report in relation to donations was that donations to political parties from any individual or organisation should be capped at £50,000 by 2012. Any amount donated over that limit would have to be returned to the donor, or forfeited to the Electoral Commission if this was not possible.

The Hayden Phillips Report also addressed the issue of trade union donations. It saw it as legitimate for unions to make donations on behalf of their members as long as those members were aware of this and had the right not to pay. The Hayden Phillips report therefore recommended that for the 3.5 million union members who currently pay into a political fund, the Affiliation Fees paid by trade unions will be treated for the purposes of the cap as individual donations of the members.

The Hayden Phillips Report also noted that with this increased transparency and choice for trade union members the ten-year review ballot on the existence of the political fund, which trade unions currently have to conduct, would no longer be necessary and should be removed.

These provisions on donations seem eminently sensible and the three major political parties, if motivated by the national rather than partisan interest, would have accepted them. However as they failed to do so the Jury Team has decided to take up the position, and to fight to clean up political donations.

Members of Select Committees, which hold the executive to account, should be elected by all MPs and not appointed by party whips, and should scrutinise all departmental proposals for legislation.

Parliament should scrutinise Government actions and proposals, cause amendments as appropriate, and, in extremis, change the composition of the Government.

When the Crown was separate from Parliament and appointed its own ministers then every line of their proposals was scrutinised and debated by Parliament. Now that the executive and legislative functions have for all practicality merged, there is nothing like the same scrutiny as there was in those days.

Parliamentary time is often used not to hold the Government to account but rather with its own MPs making political points for the Government. Such supposed questions as “May I congratulate my Right Honourable friend on …” are clearly sycophantic rather than designed for scrutiny. Indeed these questions are often planted by the whips with backbench MPs who wish to impress the party hierarchy, usually the majority of backbenchers who are depending on political advancement in that party for their career.

The weakness of Parliamentary scrutiny of Government is often cited by the UK media as a justification for the vigour with which they question and challenge the Government.

Most Government decisions are implemented through secondary legislation (regulations etc) with Statutory Instruments (governed by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946) being the mechanism by which such regulations are enacted. However Parliament now has no right to amend but only to reject them. Usually a minister just has to lay such an Instrument before Parliament and if there is no vote against it within a period of typically 40 days then under the “negative procedure” it is deemed to have been passed.

Over 3,000 Statutory Instruments are now authorised each year and only a very small proportion of these are ever reviewed by Select Committees or in any other way. Essentially as soon as they have obtained enabling primary legislation to allow such regulations to be brought in, there is no real check on what is proposed by each department.

The lack of scrutiny of Parliament is massively highlighted by its failure to prevent any proposed Statutory Instruments from becoming law. Theoretically any member of either House can put down a motion that an Instrument should be annulled but even if in the Commons the motion is signed by a large number of Members or is moved by the official Opposition it is unlikely to be debated. The last time the House of Commons annulled a Statutory Instrument was 30 years ago in 1979 when it rejected the Paraffin (Maximum Retail Prices) (Revocation) Order 1979 (SI 1979/797) since which time over 70,000 Statutory Instruments have become law.

Legislation can be proposed by the executive in over twenty different areas of Government responsibility represented by the various Whitehall departments. No individual MP can be expert on all of the areas and able to monitor each of them. A system of Select Committees therefore exists to monitor each of the departments of state.

Unfortunately the structural intent of the Select Committees (other than the Select Committee on Public Accounts) has been perverted by the party political system. The Members of the Committees and particularly the Chairs are now appointed by the whips of the respective parties. This means that the primary scrutiny system in the House of Commons has largely been neutralised as the Government normally has a majority of MPs on every Committee and these are most unlikely to support any report which is critical of the Government. In addition the full House of Commons is under no obligation to debate any of the reports produced by the Select Committees. In practice it is very rare that such reports are ever properly considered by other MPs or given a realistic response in the House of Commons by the Government departments concerned in a way which allows the response to be interrogated.

Select Committees have the power to call for evidence and many private sector organisations are very willing to provide their point of view to these committees. However the committees are unable to force any minister, civil servant or special adviser to appear before them. This is clearly unsatisfactory as it means that the Government is able to evade answering the questions that the Select Committee wishes to put to it. A simple solution would be to require any person paid for by the taxpayer to have to appear before a Select Committee just as it can require any other person to appear before it.

The Select Committees clearly need to be strengthened if Parliament is to provide any proper scrutiny of the executive. This should also be extended to reviewing proposed Government legislation prior to its coming before the full House of Commons for its first reading in order to improve the drafting of such laws and to identify the potential areas of contention (as is the practice in the Scottish Parliament). A further proper role for the Select Committees is to review all legislation after a period of, say, five years in order to see if the original justification for the legislation remains valid and whether there are any adjustments which are required.

The Select Committee on Public Accounts provides an example of how Select Committees could work as by tradition the Chair always comes from the Opposition. In addition it effectively has sufficient independent staff as its work is concentrated on reviewing the reports from the National Audit Office which is staffed by professional accountants and other experts who are not civil servants. Unlike the staff of other Select Committees they have full rights of access to departmental papers, records and interviews.

All Select Committees should be properly independent of the executive. The Jury Team Governance Proposal is therefore that the members of all Select Committees (using the way many committee members are elected in the City of London Common Council) should be chosen by a vote of the whole House of Commons rather then being appointed by the whips.

A secret ballot has now been introduced for the election of the Speaker and there is no reason why the same procedure should not be used for electing members of Select Committees.

No European directive should be enacted or enforced by secondary legislation in a stricter way than is the practice in any other European country deemed compliant for that directive by the European Commission.

It is estimated that over two thirds of new laws and regulations are linked to European Union directives. British people and businesses are fairly long suffering and will accept most regulations as part of the burden of living in a democratic society. However the area that most arouses their fury is when they perceive that under the cloak of European requirements the British Government legislates in a way that is significantly more onerous than is the case in other member states.

EU directives typically set out a minimum level of standards on the particular issue in a directive of a few pages. However the responsibility for citizen and consumer protection is that of individual Governments and therefore European directives have to be translated into national legislation.

UK Parliamentary time is scarce and it is difficult for departments to get more than a couple of legislative slots per year. The main opportunity for departmental initiatives is therefore through Statutory Instruments and the most fruitful reason for these is European directives.

A particular UK concern is that of “gold plating” which is where the UK goes beyond the minimum required by a European directive in promulgating a UK regulation whose basis is that directive. In the UK the authority for making such regulations derives from Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. This Section authorises regulations to be made for the purpose of

• “implementing any Community obligation of the United Kingdom”, or
• “dealing with matters arising out of or related to any such obligation”.

This very broad power can be used to over-ride or amend existing Acts of Parliament and this machinery to amend the law is very attractive to officials since the Statutory Instrument procedure is subject to much less Parliamentary scrutiny than a Bill. Therefore the use of regulations under Section 2(2) of the 1972 Act has ballooned enormously over the years and many important or controversial changes to the law are made by this route.

The vastly increased use of section 2(2) to make important changes to domestic law makes a mockery of the assurances which were given to the House of Commons by the Government in the course of the debates on the 1972 Act, when it was said that any important changes would be made by Bill rather than by subordinate legislation.

Since then there have been more than 15,000 uses of clause 2(2).

These regulations and other EU matters are meant to be reviewed in the Commons by a special Select Committee called the European Scrutiny Committee. However the Committee does not have the power to take any substantive votes. The Committee itself described its role as solely “sifting EU documents on behalf of the House”. It deliberates in secret, except when interviewing ministers and other non-members and this makes it harder for other MPs and the general public to know what is happening. Even if a proposed document is referred to one of the three European Standing Committees then this is likely to have little EU expertise and usually a low attendance.

Currently the EU produces around four pieces of secondary legislation each week, which means that with the UK Parliament not sitting for more than half of the days in the year, there is more than one new piece of EU legislation every Parliamentary day. There is also a great deal of other documentation coming from Brussels which can affect UK citizens or businesses. In total about 1,200 documents a year are classed as EU ones and subject to scrutiny (more than seven per Parliamentary day). Parliament is in complete recess for around 16 weeks a year, whereas the European Commission only shuts down for August. According to a Parliamentary written answer, in 2005 alone there were 68 occasions where the Council of Ministers adopted proposals which had not been reviewed by the Scrutiny Committee because the House of Commons was in recess (or was prorogued for the general election).

It is therefore proposed that the European Scrutiny Committee be reformed so that it can publicly review all proposed EU legislation before it is enacted and each departmental Select Committee be given the power to recommend agreement or rejection as appropriate of each Statutory Instrument to ensure that it is not being used for any purpose not required by the original EU directive.

MPs should normally serve for no more than three full terms.

Parliament should act in a similar way to the trustees of a charity or the non-executive directors of a major company. The Government is equivalent to the management of a charity or company which undertakes the detailed implementation of the agreed strategy. A key role of the trustees or non-executive directors is to review this implementation to see whether it is being done ethically, effectively, efficiently ad economically and in order to do this they must maintain sufficient independence to be able properly to review the proposals and actions of management.

It is vital that people are attracted to Parliament as part of their career, and not as their main career, so that they can maintain their independence.

Current Practice in the Length of MPs Careers

There are no term limits for MPs which would be a way of ensuring that MPs do not become too comfortable with their lifestyle and too separate from the rest of the population. Most US states now have such term limit legislation which also applies to the US President and the equivalent in many other countries. Without such term limits MPs are less likely to give priority to legislation or scrutiny as the job of being an MP becomes a career in itself.

At the 2005 election the Labour MP Tam Dalyell retired after 43 years and the Conservative Sir Teddy Taylor retired after 40 years. After the 2005 election, Sir Peter Tapsell continued to serve after 44 years in the House and Alan Williams was also still there after being first elected in 1964. Two other MPs had been elected in the 1960s, 37 in the 1970s and 104 in the 1980s.

Assuming that the next general election is held in 2010, two thirds of MPs will have served for more than 13 years, 38% for more than 18 years and 23% for more than 23 years, hugely longer than is allowed under any other independent scrutiny model permitted in the UK.

Term Limit Principles

Term limits are well established in the charitable and private sector. Trustees are not allowed to have any conflict of interest with their organisation or to receive any benefits from it. Similarly all major company boards should now have a majority of non-executive directors who, although paid a fixed fee, are not allowed to receive any other benefits from the company.

In particular it has been recognised that trustees and directors can lose their independence if they serve on the board for too long. The Charity Commission sets out clear guidelines on this. Similarly for public companies directors are normally elected for a period of three years and are not normally re-elected for more than three periods of three years, a total of nine years. If there are special reasons why a company wants a particular director to continue on the Board for more than nine years then that person is subject to a vote by shareholders every year instead of every three years.

In Government the agreed strategy is provided by the framework of legislation. Government departments and agencies then implement this. It is Parliament which is responsible for holding the Government to account. Unfortunately Parliament has ignored all of the corporate governance improvements it has required for other institutions in the country. There are clearly many continual influences by the executive on MPs from potential appointments to eventual seats in the House of Lords.

The Jury Team therefore proposes term limits for MPs (if there are any particular people whose time as an MP comes to an end as a result but the Prime Minister still wants them to serve in the Government, then they could be appointed to the House of Lords).

General elections will take place every five years unless a resolution of the House of Commons decides otherwise to reduce this period.

Parliament is limited to five years but elections are typically held every four to five years. The power of the Prime Minister, based on the Royal Prerogative, to decide when within the five years the election should be held is a very powerful one, especially now that opinion polls tend to be broadly correct. It is usually exercised when the incumbent sees the maximum electoral advantage for their own political party rather than for the country as a whole.

The Effect of an Uncertain Parliamentary Term

The agreed maximum length of a UK Parliament of five years is a good planning period during which a Government should be able to implement a substantial proportion of its policies. This is slightly more than the four year US Presidential cycle but less than the seven year French Presidential term.

As well as giving a political advantage to the incumbent prime minister, the uncertainty about when a general election may occur means that a lot of Parliamentary activity can be wasted as bills which have not completed all of their stages have to start again from the beginning in the new Parliament. In addition enquiries by committees stop and their reports are not published.

The uncertainty about the length of a Parliament also affects the management of all of the departments of state. Senior civil servants do not know how much effort to put into a particular policy if at an uncertain date a new Government may be elected with a different policy. This leads to inefficiency.

The Role of the House of Commons

The only reason why elections have been called at a time not of the choosing of the Prime Minister has been when the governing party has lost a vote of confidence in the House of Commons. This is however very unusual and last happened in 1979.

This should clearly remain as a sanction on the Government but other than this there is no reason for the benefit of the country, rather than for his or her political party, why the Prime Minister unilaterally should be able to dissolve Parliament using the Royal Prerogative and therefore call an election to try to get another term for him or herself.

Currently a motion of “No Confidence” passed by the House of Commons will lead to a general election. However the House of Commons conversely has no way of stopping a Prime Minister from calling an election. It is proposed that this position be reversed with there being an assumption that a Parliament will last for five years unless there is a House of Commons motion reducing this.

According to a ComRes survey of 154 MPs conducted in October 2007, 44% of MPs support fixed-term parliaments and 49% oppose them (support from 88% of Liberal Democrat MPs, 41% of Labour MPs and 25% of Tory MPs).

It is proposed that general elections should only be held every five years unless there is a resolution of the House of Commons that a general election be called, taking this discretion away from the Prime Minister.

After each future general election the House of Commons would meet to elect by secret ballot a person who would be recommended to the monarch to be Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister would then appoint the senior minister to run each department who would in turn agree with the Prime Minster the appointment of the junior ministers for that department and would have to agree to their being moved elsewhere